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1 Between the mid-1930s and independence in 1963, the British state in Kenya embarked
on a wide array of water development projects in an attempt to diversify and expand
the economic base of the colony, and more specifically within Non-Scheduled Areas (or
native  reserves).  Literature  on  the  expansion  of  statecraft  into  rural  areas  has
predominantly focused upon anti-erosion and anti-tsetse campaigns in the fertile belt
of the colony, yet all of these wider development goals necessitated the creation or
management of water resources (Anderson 1993; Kjekshus 1996; Hoppe 1998). Rather
than being considered by the state as essential resources for rural standards of living or
as explicitly human rights, these water resources were controlled on the basis of an
economic ideology that sought to erect barriers to movement, migration, and use. Prior
histories of water development in Kenya have tended to prioritize large scale irrigation
systems of the 1950s such as Perkerra or Mwea-Tabere, yet these schemes made up only
a  small  number  of  water  projects  enacted during the  colonial  era  (Chambers  1973;
Anderson 2002). Using the B2 Yatta Scheme in Kitui District as a proxy for the colonial
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development project  in Arid and Semi-Arid Landscapes (ASAL)  more generally,  this
paper argues that state attempts to control access to water and grazing grounds were
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Kamba society, while also exacerbating
class cleavages within local communities. On the B2, colonial shorthand for the Block 2
designation given to the Kitui portion of the Yatta in opposition to the B1 Machakos
portion, water and land were only provided to those willing to pay increasing sums for
the  right  and  who  would  acquiesce  to  a  range  of  social  and  cultural  restrictions.
Simultaneously, this article highlights how concern in Nairobi over the omnipresent
threat of soil erosion in the reserves led to the enactment of Malthusian policies that
pushed water sources in the reserves into disrepair (van Zwanenberg 1975). Ministry of
Agriculture officials subscribed to the now debunked theory that would become known
as the “tragedy of the commons,” and enacted strict controls over pastoral mobility as
part of their general agricultural policy (Hardin 1968; Maher 1937; Anderson & Johnson
1989; Scoones 1995; Amutabi 2013). In the B2, water resources were managed so as to
allow access  to  certain  sectors  of  society  while  those  barred from access  would be
forced into accepting destocking or sales measures. However, disagreements over how
best to manage the B2 led to a stunted implementation while the decay of resources in
the reserves led to an unprecedented build-up of pressure and need during the long
drought between 1958 and 1961. I therefore argue that the unrestrained trespass from
the reserves into the B2 land block in 1961 was inevitable, as state policy had left this
exclusive patch of land as one of the only remaining good pasture in the region.
2 In arguing this from an explicitly historical standpoint, I rely on archival sources from
both  the  British  and  Kenya  National  Archives  due  to  difficulties  in  finding  former
residents of the colonial-era B2 Scheme. Further, due to the nature of these archival
record  collections  this  paper  focuses  predominantly  on  the  B2  Grazing  Scheme.
However,  the  extension of  the  B1  project  by  Machakos  officials  will  be  outlined at
specific  points  in  order  to  demonstrate  both  alternative  approaches  to  land
management and the universality of the ecological crisis in the reserves brought about
by state action. Further, the place of the B1 demonstrates that it wasn’t the specific
approach to land and water development in Ukambani that failed, but rather the entire
premise  that  such developments  should  be  contained within  arbitrary  borders  and
restricted  to  those  with  economic  and social  capital.  By  contrasting  colonial  water
policy in the reserves with policy in the exclusive B2, the article shows how economic
rather than social concerns dominated the provision of water in the region, leading to
acts of rejection and desperation amongst herders in the reserves that undermined the
control of land and resources set aside for richer groups.
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Locations of the B1 and B2 Schemes
Base image taken from Osborne, Ethnicity and Empire, xiii.
3 Broadly speaking, the B2 Yatta Scheme sought to manage the movement and grazing of
stock, with the goal of limiting land destruction and overgrazing. A stretch of volcanic
rock stretching from the Tana River northwest of Kitui to the future Tsavo National
Park,  the  Yatta  plateau  is  marked  by  arid  grasslands  unsuited  to  agricultural
development. Boreholes and dams pockmark the landscape, and the Yatta is bifurcated
by the Mwita Syano river which eventually became the boundary between the B2 and
the B1 Schemes, located today respectively in Kitui and Machakos. The area, spanning
roughly 177 square miles, was closed off from the Kamba population of the district, and
access to the fertile grazing and watering grounds was instead made contingent on
both economic standing and a willingness to dispose of valuable stock. In both Kitui and
nearby Machakos,  escalating stock densities  as  well  as  poor rains created a perfect
storm of ecological decay in the reserves, creating a stark dissonance between the B2
Scheme and the surrounding regions. Through the creation and restriction of water,
the  state  (through  of  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture)  exacerbated  demographic  and
socioeconomic  pressures  that  ultimately  led  to  the  Schemes’  destruction  and
abandonment.  Their  failure  was  driven  by  two  interrelated  assumptions:  that
development in pastoral regions had to be profitable (as has been demonstrated by
academics such as Roger van Zwanenberg), and that better watering and grazing lands
needed to be restricted to specific locations rather than the entirety of the reserves
(van Zwanenberg 1975).
4 Amongst the Kamba, the presence of water was a key defining factor in settlement and
stock  migration  in  the  early  to  mid-twentieth  century.1 In  areas  of  poor  resource
provision,  pastoral  herders  were  forced  to  migrate  hundreds  of  miles,  and  those
wealthy enough to do so were able to employ gangs of herders to seek out the best
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grazing  lands  (Ambler  1985).  Such  migrations,  and  the  difficulties  in  working  out
exactly  who  owned  the  stock,  caused  consternation  in  the  minds  of  the  colonial
administration  throughout  the  mid-century,  as  they  believed  that  the  wholesale
movement of stock led to devastating soil erosion and the destruction of grazing lands.2
Limiting this movement required the tight management of water resources, leading the
Ministry of Agriculture to initiate a program of dam and borehole construction in the
native reserves that they hoped would preclude the need to migrate in search of water.
A network of surface water resources would save grasslands from being destroyed by
migrating stock, as well as making pastoral communities easier to monitor, manage,
and (most importantly) tax. While the underlying rationale for the plan appeared to be
common sense, the accumulative logic of colonialism meant that water resources were
not benevolently or even distributed to the community at large.
5 A lack of investment and planning meant that in the native reserves of Kitui District
water resources were inadequate for the size of the population, and prone to frequent
breakdowns.  As such,  the program proved unable to prevent stock movements and
overgrazing, leading to a degree of fatalism amongst the Ministry of Agriculture that
compelled them to adopt a more Malthusian approach to stock management in the
reserves.  In  contrast,  investment  in  water  resources  in  the  B2  unit  were  heavily
capitalized  and  widely  distributed,  offering  plentiful  resources  for  the  few  able  to
access them. These resources were predicated on a strict control of access and limited
usage, a policy which left its benefits to a fortunate view while failing to remedy the
structural inequalities being perpetuated in the reserves. However, national economic
circumstances meant that the cost-neutral program on the B2 Scheme failed to survive
the 1950s, instead being replaced by a breeding and meat-production scheme driven by
financial needs at the highest level. Again, while the economic rationale here is clear,
the approach lacked any cultural or environmental awareness of the issues facing the
reserves,  leaving  the  B2  as  a  sole  well-watered  landscape  in  stark  contrast  to  the
degradation of the reserves.
6 The control of water for economic rather than humanitarian distribution is of course
not limited to this  particular space during this particular era,  nor are the negative
implications  of  state  irrigation  development.  In  Lesotho,  British  damming policy
proved inadequate for the vagaries of the local climate, contributing to soil erosion and
the formation of large gullies (Showers 2005). Similarly, both Meredith McKittrick and
Heather  Hoag  have  shown  how  colonial  powers  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  sought to
monetize  rural  riverscapes  through  technocratic  solutions  that  were  accepted
contingently  by  local  populations,  extending  William  Adams’  assertion  that  water
development projects ignore the wider social and economic benefits of rivers and rains
(McKittrick 2015; Hoag 2013; Adams 1992). In Kenya, these projects became increasingly
prevalent in the era after 1945, as irrigation and extension projects sprouted across the
colony.  In  Kitui  however,  water  policy  was  solely  concerned  with  limiting  the
movement and consumption of pastoral communities, with little care for the needs of
the human or animal populations. As ecological conditions deteriorated, so were the
failings  of  economically  exclusionary  water  development  policies  that  failed  to
equitably distribute their benefits to the tribal whole.
7 These  policies,  and  their  clear  failings,  were  based  on  a  misunderstanding  of  both
society and ecology in the Kamba districts, and reflected long held preconceptions of
pastoral societies in Africa more generally.  Overwhelmingly,  the state subscribed to
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what  Herskovits  termed  the  “cattle  complex,”  the  misguided  assumption  that
communities’ reliance on stock stemmed from the twin evils of culture and tradition
(Herskowitz 1926). However, as Ian Scoones work on cattle ownership in Zimbabwe has
demonstrated,  communal  commitment  to  cattle  ownership  resulted  more  from
intermediary benefits such as milk production and manure (Scoones 2003). Amongst
the Kamba, these benefits diluted the appeal of ranching and compulsory sales on the
B2 despite the constant attention of state actors.  The obsession with creating static
sites of stock ownership also reflected a deep misunderstanding of the nature of Kamba
society. The psychological fixation with individual if not fixed land ownership on the
part of the state meshed poorly with the pastoral and semi-nomadic migration of stock
within Ukambani.3 To quote John Noyes in his work on land policy in German East
Africa,  “debates  surrounding nomadism contributed to  policies  of  containment  and
confinement aimed at stabilising internal boundaries and projecting then on to the
psychological constitution of disinherited natives” (Noyes 2001). Doing so necessitated
closing the Yatta frontier to settlement,  eliminating its  ownership by the collective
whole and replacing it with a strict legal framework that defined belonging and access,
creating what  Lynette  Russell  has  defined as  a  hybrid  space  defined by  interactive
processes (Russell 2001). While stockowners at times proved willing to align themselves
with these goals in order to gain access to valuable water and land in the B2, the ever-
increasing concentration of cattle in the reserves created a population timebomb that
the state rarely proved able to resolve.
8 Their failure was not through a lack of trying, however. In Kitui especially, the Ministry
of Agriculture and their local agents transitioned through a number of projects that
tried to more “properly” utilise the potential of the Yatta land. However, these schemes
were beset by disagreement and confusion stemming from the specific perspectives of
those  charged  with  managing  them.  As  Jan  Todd  has  summarized,  “scientific  and
technical knowledge arises within a given context, through the work of people focused
on particular problems, situated in particular situations or institutions, surrounded by
particular kinds of peers” (Todd 1995). In the Kamba districts, the locality of science
existed in a tripartite relationship between local communities,  District officials,  and
planners in Nairobi. The divisions inherent in this relationship explains the ways that
land and water management on the B2 came to be altered and manipulated over time
as the national political and economic situation changed. For instance, Myles Osborne
has demonstrated the degree to which development planning in Machakos (and Kitui to
a lesser extent) was tied to communal loyalty during the Mau Mau rebellion, but there
are a number of further issues at play here (Osborne 2012).
9 Most prevalently, central agricultural officers could not condone an initial project that
offered no long-term profit,  and instead pushed local officials to implement a more
restrictive and explicitly economic ranching project that exacerbated ecological decline
in the  reserves.  Further  entrenching water  resources  behind an artificial  economic
boundary meant that during times of ecological stress, there were few if any outlets for
herders  remaining  in  the  reserves.  Historians  and  anthropologists  such  as  David
Anderson, Helen Tilley, Fiona Mackenzie, and Thomas Spear have all emphasized the
flexible  and  adaptive  relationship  between  rural  populations  and  the  lands  they
inhabit, yet the restrictive and rigid boundaries implemented towards the end of the
1950s in Kitui and Machakos undermined these possibilities with dire consequences
(Anderson & Johnson 1991; Anderson 1993; Tilley 2013; MacKenzie 1998; Spear 1997).4
When  environmental  and  ecological  conditions  in  the  region  degraded  critically
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between 1958 and 1961, the mirage of state control over the land, water, and people
evaporated  as  individuals  and  communities  reasserted  their  control  of  the  liminal
space of the Yatta.
10 The  opening  section  of  this  chapter  situates  the  B2  Yatta  within  the  social  and
geographic fabric of the colonial state, narrating the fluid legal status of the region as a
whole. I will then show how water development in the Kitui reserves and the B2 land
block escalated dramatically after 1940 and 1945 with the successive (if limited) influx
of funding brought about by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. The article
then  describes  the  implementation  of  the  B2  (Yatta)  Grazing  Scheme,  and  the
ideological basis of this. The piece then analyses how these measures led to class and
economic cleavages within Kamba society and the state’s inability to reckon with these
changes, with a comparative analysis of the B1. Finally, the article shows how changes
within the Ministry of Agriculture fomented a change within the B2 scheme, leading to
divestments from reserve water supplies in order to force stock owners to sell or move
their  stock;  such an approach demonstrates  with great  clarity  the lack of  social  or
cultural awareness on the part of the state.
 
The Kitui Yatta before 1938
11 None  of  this  is  to  say  that  the  state’s  awareness  of  the  cattle  economy  arose
spontaneously after the war. Indeed, they were forcefully reminded of the centrality of
stock to Kamba society throughout the first part of the twentieth century, and this
relationship  reached  a  head  in  1938  with  a  heavy  handed  attempt  to  destock  the
Machakos Reserve that  led to  the outbreak of  rebellion and civil  disobedience that
threatened  briefly  to  precipitate  a  civil  war.  The  disagreement  demonstrated  the
absence of cultural awareness within the colonial state as they failed to recognise the
predominance  of  cattle,  which  according  to  Robert  Tignor  served  as  medium  of
exchange, used to pay dowries, penalties, and fines (Tignor 1971). More practically, the
cow was  a  source  of  livelihood and independence  to  Kamba families,  as  it  enabled
communities to stave off incorporation into the colonial economy (Ibid.). The state’s
inability  (or  unwillingness)  to  countenance  these  social factors  would  become  a
recurring theme over the following 25 years.
12 Throughout  the  1920s  and  1930s,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  became  increasingly
concerned  at  the  abundance  of  stock  within  especially  the  Kamba  reserves,  and
temporarily opened the Yatta land as temporary grazing in the 1920s. The distinction
was key: prior to the ruling, the B2 had been Crown Lands and thus managed by the
state  to  exclude  native  populations.  Granting  temporary  grazing  left  the  state  in
control  of  access,  but  gave  an  outlet  for  stockowners  who  had  seen  their  stock
impounded within the restricted native reserves. Within the reserves, land dwindled
thanks to the creeping replacement of pastoral lands with cash crops, concentrating a
growing number of stock into a shrinking landscape, and in 1934 the Land Commission
argued for urgent destocking and reconditioning of the land, as well as the opening of
the Yatta again for temporary grazing. By 1938, the resident soil officer claimed that at
the  Machakos  Kamba  were  “rapidly  drifting  to  a  state  of  hopeless  and  miserable
poverty and their land to a parching desert of rock, stones, and sand” (Maher 1937).
These drastic conditions called for drastic remedies, leading the Ministry of Agriculture
to call for the compulsory destocking of the Machakos Reserve; Kitui was spared at this
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time by virtue of its lower density of both stock and humans. Stock were purchased at a
price below market rate, and in some cases it was claimed that over 90% of individuals’
stock were sold. Unsurprisingly, the program caused an enormous amount resistance
that  led  thousands  of  Kamba  to  march  on  Nairobi,  as  well  as  the  formation  of
intersectional political parties that crossed tribal lines. As Myles Osborne describes, the
threat of national rebellion forced the state’s hand, and they ultimately backed down
on the plan in 1939. Having made their resistance to the state clear, as well as their
commitment to the pastoral economy, the Kamba returned to the rangelands having
driven home the fact they wouldn’t be beholden to the kinds of coercive statecraft that
the destocking episode had sought to impose.
13 The destocking crisis  precipitated a different approach to destocking in Kitui.  Soon
after the conclusion of the controversy, the District received a grant of £10,000 from
the Colonial Development Fund for improving water supplies in the region.5 Although
not  wholly  directed  to  the  stock  issue  given  the  need  for  water  in  permanent
settlements, the grant marks the first step into what became the overarching policy of
social and agricultural development in the district. Rather than enforcing the removal
of stock, the state instead began to incorporate water and environmental resources
into their development plans with the goal of managing the movement and distribution
of  stock.  Prior  to  this  point,  dam  construction  had  been  the  preferred  means  of
improving supply,  a  relatively informal approach that was generally undertaken by
communal labour under the eye of the African District Council. While this legislative
compulsion for communal labour remained in place for local supply up to 1959 it was
predominantly directed to smaller scale projects the benefit the tribal whole, a means
of outsourcing the cost and work of improvement onto the communities themselves.6
Such an approach absolved the state of responsibility for improving supply, and led to
the  continued  use  of  existing  resources  rather  than  their  extension  for  a  growing
human and stock population in the reserves. The locational marker here is important,
as the state adopted dramatically divergent approaches to water provision not only
between development schemes and the reserves, but also between different schemes
themselves. Although the 1938 grant marks the point at which the state elected to take
some  responsibility  for  water  resources  in  the  region,  provision  in  the  reserves
remained consistent for the following twenty-five years while in the exclusive spaces of




14 While  community-led  water  development  took  precedence  within  the  reserves,  the
state dedicated their  attention to creating and managing the land of  the tenuously
controlled Yatta. The B2 region in Kitui spanned 177 square miles of which just 50 were
initially considered to be good grazing, with the rest consisting of varying degrees of
bushlands  and  a  small  portion  of  “badlands.”7 The  Commissioner  for  Lands  and
Settlement gazette the land as a Temporary Native Land Unit on October 27th 1938,
creating an outlet for pastoral communities in Kitui, as officials hoped that opening up
new grazing lands would reduce overstocking in the district reserves. In return for the
newly opened lands, the state charged the Local Native Commissioner a fee of 100 Shs
that was to be recouped through nominal payments by stock owners.8 However a lack
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of oversight undermined the district’s ability to collect the fee, and in the early years
the money was rarely if ever collected.9
15 Indeed, demand was so high that the program was suspended in 1946 and the existing
graziers removed. The land had become the preserve of a wealthy class of graziers who
could afford to pay the tenancy fee; in effect, these individuals used the land as an
additional grazing ground, frequently migrating their stock across the poorly marked
boundary. 10 Further, the group was described by the District Commissioner as being
“ranchers of the most conservative type,” an attribute that in his mind explained their
reticence to take advantage of the good slaughter prices being offered by the Meat
Marketing  Board,  apparently  unaware  of  the  cultural  context  of  stock  ownership.11
Such migrations caused major harm to the grasslands and watering points along the
way, furthering the very ecological damage that the plan had sought to alleviate. The
state’s  exhibition  of  soft  power  had  thus  come undone  due  to  class  and  economic
dynamics that they hadn’t fully prepared for; an oversight that would reoccur again
over the next few years. One official even claimed that Kamba held what amounted to a
religious  attitude  towards  their  cattle,  while  another  appeared  certain  that  any
attempts to compulsorily destock to the necessary degree would prove futile.12 Despite
the setback, by 1948 the recovery of the grasslands had proceeded quickly enough that
stock were slowly able to be readmitted. Rather than charging a grazing fee, the state
instead opted for a quid pro quo arrangement that allowed stockowners to access the
land if  they agreed to clear two acres of  heavy bush per 30 head of  cattle,  a  move
designed to increase the amount of good grazing pasture in the region.13 Owners from
the five surrounding locations began moving their stock into the B2 the following year.
16 The roughshod implementation of the temporary grazing scheme led the state to take a
more hands on approach to improving grazing conditions in the land, as population
increases meant that the region was quickly becoming the last hope for grazing control
and development in the region. Through the provision of better water supplies it was
hoped that the carrying capacity of the land could be gradually increased, allowing a
greater  number  of  stock  owners  to  enter  the  area  under  strict  grazing  conditions.
Indeed, water was intricately tied to the state’s idealized vision of land use, and from
the  very  inception  of  the  B2  Scheme  in  1949  access  would  be  conditional  on  the
acceptance  of  any  conditions  the  state  sought  to  impose,  “however  rigid.”14 Such
impositions were deemed necessary for three, interrelated reasons, all of which relied
upon the compulsion of Kamba stockowners. First, restrictions would allow the B2 to
most  efficiently  act  as  a  relief  area  for  the  overstocked  reserves.  Second,  the
enforcement  of  good  management  in  the  Yatta  would  demonstrate  the  benefits  of
improved  animal  husbandry  to  Kamba  in  other  parts  of  the  reserve.  Finally,  the
improved quality of stock grazing in the scheme would offer a large supply of slaughter
stock for  export  to  other  districts.  Taken collectively,  these intentions indicate  the
state’s desire for more efficient and more profitable stock ownership, stripping it of
any social or cultural significance in favour of economic utility.
17 As the destocking controversy of 1938 had demonstrated, however, the state lacked any
real political means for compelling stock owners to take part in this scheme. Despite
degrees  of  land  degradation  within  the  reserves  and  the  growing  threat  of
overstocking, Kamba stockowners had little interest in submitting to state directives
unless absolutely necessary. Owners of smaller herds lacked the labour to send their
stock to the B2 to take advantage of the land clearance agreement, while larger herders
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had enough social capital and political leverage to come and go as they pleased. As
such,  the  state  elected  to  weaponize  the  one  factor  that  they  could  control  in
compelling owners to use the new scheme. Creating new water resources could compel
stock owners to acquiesce to restrictions in return for access, a move that would solve
overstocking the reserves through the osmosis of larger herds into the new lands.
 
The B2 (Yatta) Grazing Scheme
18 Between 1938 and 1949, twelve dams had been constructed in an attempt to alleviate
the impact of long range migration, but all  but one of these provided little value.15
Alongside the logistical challenges of creating accessible resources, there was also the
very practical issue of whether the land and ecology could provide such production.
Even by the end of  the 1940s,  as plans to turn the B2 into a self-sufficient grazing
scheme  were  being  crystallized,  there  was  still  confusion  within  the  Ministry  of
Agriculture and the District Commission about whether the requisite resources were
available. In addition to the existing dams, the early provision of basic boreholes was
soon deemed essential to the scheme, necessitating widespread surveys to discover the
depth of the bore,  transport distances,  and the resistivity of the land.16 While Kitui
District  Commissioner  W.  F.  P.  Kelly  retained  confidence  in  the  potential  of  dam
building in the area, despite the failure of the eleven prior attempts, he conceded that
the  creation  of  a  borehole  network  would  be  “essential  for  an  economic  ranching
scheme.”17 To that end, the initial estimates for the project called for five boreholes of
no more than 400 feet to be drilled, at a cost of 18,000 Shs each.18 At this point no
geophysical surveys had been conducted in the region, and it wasn’t until June of 1950
(three months after  the initial  estimates  had been submitted and approved)  that  a
report on borehole investigations in the area was produced.
19 Surveyors carried out tests in nine different areas within the Yatta, chosen primarily
for their geographic distribution rather than any specific geological criteria. Such an
approach  was  driven  by  a  very  practical  necessity,  to  achieve  “a  wide  and  even
distribution of supplies, in order that efficient grazing control in the future could be
ensured.”19 Four of the sites were recommended for drilling, and the surveyors noted
that progress on the project would be both difficult and slow due to the hardness of the
rock. However, Engineer-Geologist G. E. Classen also warned that boreholes were just
one aspect of the solution as any concentration of stock around the chosen locations
would  simply  lead  to  the  perpetuation  of  overgrazing.  Instead,  they  advised  that
boreholes “should rather be regarded as reserves of water in times of drought when
dams, sited at more or less regular intervals and providing the normal source of supply
for  cattle,  become  dry.”20 All  involved  in  the  project  thus  agreed  on  the  need  for
equitably distributed supplies, but it remained unclear throughout the course of the
scheme  about  whether  these  would  ever  come  to  fruition.  Without  remedy,  the
incomplete  nature  of  the  water  network  in  the  B2  threatened  to  exacerbate
overgrazing and social tensions across the reserve by limiting the practical utility of
the project.
20 The poor planning and the uncertainty surrounding available resources meant that the
viability of  the scheme always remained in question,  even after its  confirmation in
1952. As more stock arrived, it became increasingly clear that the available resources
there  were  insufficient  for  the  purpose,  while  the  dams  and  boreholes  of  the
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surrounding  reserves  were starved  of  investment  as  financing  channelled  into  the
Yatta.  However,  the  scale  of  this  investment  never  allowed  for  the  expansion  of
borehole resources in the B2, and instead small grants were provided for the building
of small concrete dams in 1954 and 1955. Of the £20,000 allocated to water resources in
the scheme by 1960, half of this was allocated to borehole drilling in 1952 in the form of
a loan from the African Land and Development Board. 21 The rest contributed to the
construction of dams that as recently as 1950 had been claimed to be inappropriate for
the task at hand.
21 The change in policy stemmed primarily from the geological qualities of the region. By
1954 only three of the five boreholes were in use, and surveyors realized that the rocky
base of southern portion of the Yatta was utterly impenetrable. As such, surface and
subsurface dams were the only possible solution if this portion of the land was to be
properly  utilized.22 These  would  be  supplemented  by  the  largest  infrastructural
element  of  the  B2  Scheme,  the  Yatta  Furrow.  To  reduce  the  overreliance  on
increasingly  unreliable  dams  and  boreholes,  the  African  Land  Utilization  and
Development Board proposed the construction of a canal from the Thika River to the
Mwita Syano that bifurcated the Yatta. The project was to be undertaken by Mau Mau
detainees swept up in Operation Anvil in 1954, as the state and Prisons Office sought
productive employment for suspected rebels. In addition to the Furrow, the districts of
Kitui  and  Machakos  received  a  disproportionate  per  capita  amount  of  colonial
development funding throughout the Emergency, part of what Osborne has termed the
“development  deal”  designed  to  buy  Kamba  loyalty  (Osborne  2015).  Much  like
irrigation works in Tana River and elsewhere, the Yatta Furrow took advantage of the
political situation to fulfil long term policy objectives; a canal had been proposed as
early as 1938 but had not come to fruition due to a lack of labour and money. The
Emergency remedied both of these concerns, enabling the construction of a ten-feet
wide,  forty-mile-long  canal  that  provided  irrigated  agricultural  plots  as  well  as
rotational grazing for pastoral communities. After detainees began to be repatriated in
1958, the final parts of the project were completed by paid labourers. Costing £350,000,
by the time of  its  completion in 1959 it  was hoped that the Furrow would provide
grazing for 20,000 cattle, a marked increase on the 7,500 present there in 1959.23 The
increased stock numbers would require further extensions of the water supply into the
B2 area through added pipelines and the full clearance of the southern bush, but by
1960 social and environmental conditions had begun to conspire against the fulfilment
of these hopes.
 
The B1 Yatta 1938–58
22 Simultaneously, across the district border in Machakos, the District Office there chose a
different avenue to the exploitation of the Yatta’s potential. Machakos district had long
been considered one of the most densely populated regions in the colony, and as such
received the highest per capita development spending of any location (Osborne 2015).
For the most part,  spending was directed at the spectre of soil  erosion, as well  the
omnipresent threat of tsetse fly.24 The state deemed these twin evils the major barriers
to production, and necessitated strict controls of grazing and stock growth to prevent
what they considered the denudation of the landscape. Within the native reserves, the
African  Land  Utilisation  and  Settlement  Board  in  1947  believed  that  the  carrying
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capacity of the land was exceeded by nearly 190,000 people, with few outlets for either
settlement or economic growth.25 Despite allocating over £100,000 to betterment in the
reserves between 1952 and 1953, escalating population densities within Machakos made
the Machakos Yatta, named the B1, an area which was added to the densely settled area
of Machakos an increasingly precious resource.26
23 The B1 located in Machakos had been gazetted as a Temporary Native Land Unit in 1938
to allow for dry season grazing and lay on the Yatta Plateau between the Athi and the
Mwita  Syano rivers.  The B1  had first  been administratively  assigned to  the  Kamba
under the Kenya Land Commission of 1933, on the condition that the state had the right
to reincorporate the area into the Crown Lands in the event of what they considered be
misuse.27 To this end, the African District Council of Machakos took on the running of
the  area,  charging  six  shilling  per  head  of  cattle  per  annum.28 Some  5,000  Kamba
resided temporarily in the area along with around 23,000 stock animals, revealing a
somewhat  different  approach  to  land  management  than  was  occurring  on  the  B2,
where  even  temporary  settlement  was  outlawed.29 Rather  than  evicting  squatting
herders in the B1, as had happened in the B2, the Machakos District Council opted to
allow relatively high levels of settlement in the region to try and ease the burden of
overcrowding in the reserves. By 1953 the B1 had reached its capacity and exhibited
signs of increasing overgrazing thanks to the relatively unencumbered arrival of new
stock. With no new admittances possible after 1953, the region was unable to offer any
respite  for  the  reserve  lands  in  Machakos,  necessitating  greater  legal  and
infrastructural interventions into the landscape to solve the question of grazing in the
district.30 As District Commissioner for Machackos D.J. Penwill asserted, “the African
reserves are bursting with stock, and somehow or other an outlet must be found or the
situation will be tragic.”31
24 To try and solve the issue, the Machakos District Office began to implement plans for a
full settlement and ranching scheme that would allow accepted graziers live and work
in the B1. These residents would live on separated plots, and graze their cattle on a
rotational basis in demarcated paddocks. The viability of this scheme was enabled first
by  the  construction of  31  dams  and  8  boreholes  and  then  the  construction  of  the
Furrow itself in 1958.32 These related developments allowed the District Agricultural
Committee  and  the  Machakos  ADC  to  exert  much  stronger  controls  over  the  B1,
reducing  the  number  of  stock  allowed  while  also  centralizing  their  movements
throughout  the  1950s.  Nonetheless,  access  to  this  region was  dictated by  economic
standing, and so the B1 Ranch did little to overcome structural inequalities within the
Machakos communities, or the ecological damage to the reserves created by colonial
administrative  policies.  Generally  speaking  however,  although  the  initial  methods
differed, the overt goal in the Machakos B1 of creating exclusionary water and grazing
areas replicated control measures in the B2.
 
Enclosing Water Resources in the B2
25 Throughout the lifetime of the project, conditions in the B2 area to a great extent relied
upon the state of the reserves. Even prior to the Scheme’s genesis, the land there had
been  essential  emergency  grazing  lands  for  the  Kamba  in  Kitui  and  Machakos.
Delineating the area as  a  self-sufficient  scheme not  only required the creation and
management  of  water  infrastructure,  but  also  the  closing  of  this  liminal  space  to
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unwelcome  subjects.  That  water  resources  in  the  reserve  were  inadequate  was  no
secret to the District Officers charged with overseeing the region, and in the barren
year of 1944 the outgoing DC went as far to say that “the tribe at present depends for its
existence  on  “illegal”  grazing  outside  of  the  gazetted  reserve  boundaries.”33 The
community impact of hardening locational boundaries was of secondary importance to
the control of grazing lands and the demonstration of effective land use, however.
26 The enclosure of the Kitui Yatta was brought about by twin fears. On the other, the
delicate ecological balance of the area continued to be threatened by illegal grazing
from Kitui as well, requiring strict access regulations to be imposed in order to protect
the  grasslands  and  the  few  water  supplies.  Frequent  incursions  from  both  areas
throughout the early 1940s draw attention to the liminal and unmanaged nature of the
land; although now well established as temporary native land, few mechanisms were in
place to ensure that graziers abided by the rules. It wasn’t until 1945 that the District
Office finally demarcated the easterly boundary of the area in an attempt to assert their
control  over  the  region,  leaving  “no  possible  excuse  for  trespassers”  from  either
Machakos  or  the  Kitui  reserve.34 Restricting  access  was  the  first  step  in  abolishing
settlement in the area, instead enforcing “the idea of a European owned stock farm for
the production of beef” by ensuring the land was directed purely to the extension of
grazing.35 From this point onwards, access from Kitui became increasingly restricted in
order  to  maximize  both  the  quality  of  the  land  and  the  financial  potential  of  the
scheme.
27 Understandably, restricting access to valuable emergency lands caused consternation
amongst Kamba stockowners who saw the B2 as a necessary tool for limiting stock
losses during times of drought or famine. The problem was especially exacerbated in
the  formative  years  of  grazing  policy  after  the  war,  in  advance  of  the  centralized
scheme’s initiation. Rather than opening the area to graziers from the six locations
surrounding the Yatta,  access was granted to only one location at  a time, with the
rationale that each location’s stock could be grazed their while their home location
recovered.36 In  response,  Councillors  Mwenda  and  Kasina  of  the  Mutonguni  and
Mwigani locations suggested that each of the six locations be allowed to graze 1,000
head of stock on the land. 37 The disagreement reveals a key division in perceptions of
the B2. While the President of the Local Native Council, R.D.F. Ryland, believed the land
to be an outlet for the temporary respite of reserve grasslands, both Chiefs and Kamba
stockowners envisioned it as a pressure valve for grazing. At a basic level, the state
viewed grazing on the Yatta and in the reserves as mutually exclusive solutions while
the Kamba firmly believed it to be an extension of the reserve lands.
28 Exclusionary access arrangements were gradually codified after 1948, as the District’s
Local Native Council agreed to an array of regulations in June. Branding in particular
was a key element of the state’s attempt to transition the Yatta away from a communal
outlet towards a manageable, bureaucratized space. As part of these attempts, a cattle
census took place in 1949 that necessitated the branding of all stock in the district, as
without this it  “would be impossible to introduce good cattle farming” through the
management of pasture and the provision of water supplies.38 Again, while the process
was part of the systematic management of land engrained during the latter part of the
colonial  era  it  erected  another  barrier  for  communal  use  of  the  land,  in  essence
creating a legally binding sense of who could or could not access superior grazing and
watering points. After surveying the Yatta alongside the Senior Assistant Agricultural
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Officer, the President of the Council proposed opening the land to grazing as long as
stock numbers could be regulated. Those stock could only be grazed on the land if they
came from selected manyattas surrounding the area and if they were branded, while
stockowners from other locations were barred from migrating their stock to the Mwita
Syano on the western edge of the Yatta.39 In effect, this gave access to the privileged
few while stock owners who refused to have their cattle regulated were barred from
one of the major watering grounds in the region.
29 These prerequisites were essential for the finalization of the B2 Rules in 1952, which
enshrined access regulations within a legal framework. It was hoped that the Scheme
would  depopulate  the  reserve  lands  and  thus  improve  the  grazing  situation  there,
however a number of regulations worked against this desire. The Rules issued licenses
to  stock  owners  who wished to  graze  their  land on the  unit  and gave  the  District
Commissioner the power to exclude or expel surplus stock in the event that owners
tried to circumvent the regulations. Further, stock could only be removed from the B2
with the express permission of the Commissioner.40 This legislation hoped to enforce
stock sales by making it difficult to migrate stock back and forth across the border,
thus creating a terminal density within the reserves. In actuality, those unable to afford
the charge claimed that their exclusion from the project enabled wealthier owners to
distribute their stock across a larger landscape. Restrictive legislation meant that many
stockowners used the B2 as a place where older stock could be put out to pasture,
rather than improving the quality of younger animals as the state had intended. By
1955, 144 owners (25.6% of the total) accounted for over 62% of the stock on the Yatta:
Cattle Numbers No. of Owners Total Stock
> 100 2 269
Between 50 and 100 22 1467
Between 30 and 50 45 1651
Between 20 and 30 80 1839
Between 10 and 20 158 2007
<10 254 1159
Total 561 8392
BV/14/244. Kitui (B.2) Yatta Grazing Scheme, 1955, 2.
30 The above table  demonstrates  that  definitions  of  wealth varied wildly  between the
Kamba and the colonial state, as administrators claimed that the data disproved Kamba
complaints about richer owners’ monopoly of the region by proving that the area was
open to any size of herd. Technically speaking, this assertion is correct, as the table
shows  that  the  most  populous  ownership  stratum  was  that  of  owners  with  herds
smaller than 10 stock. In terms of total cattle however table one makes abundantly
clear the fact smallholders, while individually numerous, had their stock outnumbered
by those possessing more than 20 cattle at a time. This disparity gets to the heart of
why the state disregarded Kamba complaints regarding the scheme, as their definitions
of large- and smallholders differed greatly from complainants. For those complainants,
the very perception that  the B2 was  an exclusive  space for  richer  members  of  the
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community fed into the belief that resources were being redirected away from the tribe
and  region  at  large.  From  the  perspective  of  these  families,  water  and land  were
available only to those with social and financial capital. Given the periodic drought and
famines suffered in the Native Reserves, the withholding of grazing and water behind
an  artificial  boundary  in  times  of  suffering  seemed  to  constitute  a  betrayal  of
communal principles by the state.  Poorer stock owners were therefore left  with no
choice but to either toil on degraded lands or to trespass into crown lands.
 
Transitioning to a B2 Ranching Scheme, 1956
31 Despite these pressures,  within the scheme’s boundaries the state had succeeded in
creating  what  one  official  called  a  “veritable  Garden  of  Eden,”  characterized  by
improved  pastures  and  well-watered  stock.  Further,  the  project  proved  to  be
enormously economical for the African District Council, as the initial capital injection
and increased grazing fee fostered a self-sufficient development scheme. Beneath the
surface however, confusion over the project’s goals within the Ministry of Agriculture
and the state’s need for increased profitability in the area contributed to a decline on
the B2 that critically endangered its viability. In particular, conflicts over the ultimate
aims of the project were driven by central experts in the Ministry of Agriculture, who
frequently clashed with local officials over the point and economic utility of the B2
project. This latter point is highly indicative of rural development more general under
the late-colonial state, as economically driven central officials clashed with “men on
the spot” over the social and political consequences of development schemes.
32 Despite periodic advancements in land management within the District at large the
Provincial Agricultural Officer still feared that livestock management stood on tenuous
ground in the region. Although “more enlightened people are realizing that stock need
to be controlled,” he feared that for the majority this was a “nettle which is still not
being boldly grasped.”41 To counter these concerns, the Livestock Officer recommended
an increase in funding on the Yatta to pay for improved water and grazing facilities, as
part of a desire to drive home the benefits of efficient land management to both locals
and  the  colonial  state  at  large,  while  also  expanding  the  potential  benefits  of  the
project for the surrounding reserves. He advised the project become “a demonstration
of what can be done when reasonable capital be provided” by tapping into existing
resources.42 The  exhibitory  imperative  implied  here  caused  confusion,  especially
between  Ministry  of  Agriculture  officials  and  the  men  on  the  spot.  Local  officials
believed that the improved grazing on the Yatta could demonstrate the benefits  of
development investment in arid regions by easing pressures in the reserves, but this
sentiment was not widely shared in Nairobi. In contrast, one official argued that the
scheme’s  “primary  purpose  is  to  demonstrate  that  marginal  lands  can  be  farmed
successfully by proper controlled grazing,” and that any claims that the project was
designed to relieve grazing pressures in the reserves was “entirely erroneous” and that
this outcome was “a fortuitous benefit.”43 Of course, this claim is easily dismissed if we
consider the long-term discussions surrounding the scheme’s launch.
33 The  obstinacy  with  which  the  point  was  made  incensed  livestock  and  agriculture
officials within the B2, and understandably so. Approval for the project in 1952 had
specifically outlined grazing relief as a cornerstone of the scheme’s importance, with
the demonstration of good land use being of secondary importance. To this point, the
A Wasted Eden: Colonial Water Management and Ecological Change in Kitui, Keny...
Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review, 55 | 2020
14
B2 had shown that restricted grazing could improve land quality and water points in
both the reserves and the scheme itself, even considering the disparity in investment
between the two locations. Indeed, such was their belief in the project’s utility that the
African District Council increased grazing fees to ten shillings per animal in 1956.44 The
money allowed the African District Council and District Office to extend water supplies
in the southern portion of the Yatta, extending the carrying capacity of the land and
allowing more stock to be taken off from nearby locations.45 Nonetheless, perceptions
grew that the benefits offered by the scheme had reached their nadir, and that in the
long term it would be near impossible to increase the stock population any further.
Despite  the  protestations  of  local  officials,  changes  in  governmental  priorities
stemming from financial pressures as well as the heightened tensions of the Emergency
generated a range of counter policies to improve the usefulness of the project.
34 As early as 1955,  officials  within the Agricultural  and Veterinary Offices tentatively
began to suggest a reorientation of the scheme with the intention of making the area
more profitable for the regional economy. The abundance of animals across Ukambani
led profit-minded administrators to see the region as a reservoir of slaughter stock to
feed  the  increasing  urban  population  of  the  colony.  A  generally  broad  consensus
developed amongst all departments that the B2 had a role to play in this, yet opinions
diverged  about  the  best  way  to  accomplish  it.  The  chief  Livestock  Officer  on  the
scheme, E. Hall, felt the best way to do this was to prove the benefits of limited stock
ownership to the greater herd through the expansion of  the existing watering and
grazing scheme.46 By proving that the quality of stock could be improved by reducing
herds  and  taking  advantage  of  newly  invested  water  resources,  owners  would  be
incentivized to  sell  stock  and use  the  money to  improve  the  land in  neighbouring
locations. His plan to encourage this proposal compelled stock owners in the Yatta to
sell the “natural increase” in their herds for slaughter, but the area generally lacked
the infrastructural nodes to expand sales further.47 The first steps to remedy this came
with the construction of a sale site on the edge of the Yatta, designed to impound cattle
before sale to prevent them from overgrazing the Scheme in the intervening period.48 It
became increasingly clear, however, that the quality of stock leaving both the Yatta and
the surrounding locations would not satiate regional demands thanks to the reticence
of the local community to sell their best stock. Evidently, if anything was to become of
the  Ministry’s  hopes  for  a  robust  meat  sales  market  then  it  would  have  to  occur
through compulsion rather than volunteerism.
35 These difficulties further served to drive home the sentiment amongst officials that the
scheme was “past its sell by date,” in the words of the Assistant Agricultural Officer.49
They remarked that  the  project  no  longer  contributed  anything  to  the  problem of
overgrazing in the Reserve, as stockowners loudly and forcefully rejected destocking
measures,  and  recommended  a  gradual  transition  to  ranching.  Under  the  nascent
ranching plan, any stock already on the B2 would be allowed to remain but none would
be  admitted  on  the  old  terms;  further,  any  stock  leaving  during  the  intermediary
period would be prevented from returning. Young stock were then to be bought from
owners in the reserves, in order to be fed, fattened, and sold to the Meat Board.50 The
projected changes ostensibly served two purposes.  First,  it  would prevent the Yatta
from becoming an incubator for older,  unprofitable stock, as had been the case for
much of the scheme’s existence. Second, it would provide valuable funds to the African
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District Council that could then be reinvested in the community, as the higher price of
good quality meat would hopefully lead to increased sales to the Meat Board.
36 There  was,  however,  a  dark  underbelly  to  these  changes.  With  young  stock  being
earmarked for the B2, the population of the reserves would be built of predominantly
older and less valuable cattle. In the eyes of the Agricultural Committee, their lack of
value essentially made these animals a disposable drain on resources, utterly ignoring
their social and economic value to Kamba communities. As the stock population grew
past  the state’s  recommended carrying capacity for  the land,  the Asst.  Agricultural
Officer  recommended  drastic  measures  in  dealing  with  the  issue  that  included
withholding water resources if owners refused to sell or slaughter their animals. He
argued that the overgrazing problem was fundamentally driven by access to resources,
and that it would be better to suppress the availability of water and see stock die than
extend water supplies and perpetuate overgrazing.51 The recommendation replicated
the official sentiments of the Royal Commission on land management, and was justified
by  the  concern that  providing  water  in  well  stocked areas  would  contribute  to  an
increase in poor scrub stock.52 However, the Malthusian sentiments at the heart of the
policy suggestion get to the heart of the cultural dissonance between the state and
owners. For the state, stock numbers were an environmental and ecological hazard that
needed to be controlled by any means necessary. For owners, stock were a social and
economic necessity that were to be sustained at all costs. It is especially critical to note
that  the  Ministry  was  by  no  means  unaware  of  the  fallacies  of  their  destocking
approach. The 1938 incident had left a lasting imprint on institutional knowledge, and
just ten years earlier the then-DC of Machakos,  G.R.B Brown, had fully asserted the
fallacy  of  mass  destocking  as  a  policy  destined  for  violent  rejection.53 Even  then-
Governor  Sir  Philip  Mitchell  appeared  aware  of  the  importance  of  stock  to  the
community in 1944 when suggesting that new grazing lands be sought out instead of
limiting population growth, given the needs of the people for essential meat, milk, and
manure.54 That they and others had had their common-sense rejected and discarded is
symptomatic of the Ministry’s drive for progress at any cost after 1955.
 
Ranching Concerns, 1956–61
37 The B2’s transition from grazing scheme to ranching occurred quickly over the course
of 1956 and 1957. Initial estimates placed the total capital expenditure on the Ranch at
£62,700,  the  vast  majority  of  which  would  be  used  to  purchase  the  existing  calves
residing there as well as siting new water supplies.55 The Agricultural Office hoped that
by the third year the Ranch would be selling 1,000 stock per year to the Meat Board, as
well as purchasing 1,000 new calves a year.56 The circulation of stock would initially
contribute to the gradual sale of all existing tenant stock, and their replacement with
new, younger animals that could be improved for sale. The circulation of stock this
enabled would gradually lead to the migration of young animals to the Ranch, leaving
stockowners in the reserve to graze only mature older animals. Ideally, the Agricultural
Office hoped that the removal of fresh stock would lead to the natural decline of stock
numbers  in  the  Reserves  as  breeding  stock  aged,  capping  the  possible  increase.  Of
course, managing the circle of life in this way relied upon the African District Council
being able to fund the purchase of young stock, and the willingness of owners in the
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reserves to sell. The disparity between theory and reality would again prove telling as
the Ranch progressed.
38 The policy reflects a wider change in attitudes towards pastoral development in arid
regions, summarized succinctly by Meadows:
If  I  suggested or supported the reference in the Five Year Plan which says “the
primary need is an increased and greater distribution of water supplies” then I have
changed my mind… the primary need is control of stock numbers.57
39 Essentially, this meant sacrificing the water resources of the reserves to save the land
itself.  Little  time  was  given  over  to  the  impact  of  this  Pyrrhic  victory  on  local
stockholders,  and instead water was deemed to be a sacrificial  entity that could be
leveraged to secure the wider aims of the agriculture department. Ranching in alliance
with  water  restrictions  could  artificially  suppress  natural  increases  by  removing
valuable young animals for fattening and sale outside of the region, while starving out
older or less economically useful stock. By mid 1955, there were nearly five hundred
thousand units of stock in the Native Land Unit, a number that the state considered to
be an unsustainable level of overgrazing. However, their responses were consistently
opposed by  the  District  Commissioner  and his  subordinates  who saw ranching and
grazing control as retrogressive steps imposed from above, without any consideration
of local social and cultural needs. The disagreement here is telling, and again sets out
the fundamental fracture within development policy. Rather than paying heed to the
individuals on the ground, the Agricultural Office felt that destocking was a problem
only  solved  through  a  wholescale  importation  of  European  or  American  ranching
models  and  restrictive  legislation,  considering  the  stock  question  a  social  problem
rather than one bearing any relation to the economics of agriculture.58
40 So  it  was  that  water  became the  key  point  of  leverage  within  Kitui’s  development
policy. In Kitui, stock and water restrictions ensured that vast areas were starved of
resources and ecologically tenuous, while similar restrictions had been imposed across
the border in Kitui. Broken or closed water points would lead to desperation on the
part of stockowners, and desperation would lead to sale.59 The policy left the nascent
ranching scheme on the B2 as the only well-watered and low density grazing in the
area; the final plans dictated that 90% of the admitted cattle should be castrated young
steers, while 10% should be young heifers that would breed with high quality imported
bulls, all under the watchful eye of the Kitui Development Committee rather than the
ADC.60 “The  improved  progeny”  could  then  be  sold  back  to  the  reserve  to  as  a
manifestation of the benefits of good grazing and breeding, providing an incentive for
external  stockholders to clear bush for paddocks.  More importantly,  the nucleus of
high-quality stock could be sold across the colony and provide a much-needed cash
injection for the District Council. The economic potential of the project ensured that it
was warmly welcomed by the District Agricultural Committee, and they committed to
the importation of ten Sahiwal bulls from the Veterinary Breeding Centre in Ngong.61
These bulls, alongside legislative compulsion and greater incentives for stockowners,
allowed the project to expand rapidly. In the four years between 1956 and 1960, 2770
head of cattle were sold for a total of £21,138, while a herd of 1,000 young steers had
settled in the area.  Young heifers  imported for  breeding were kept for  a  period of
around fifteen months before being returned to their owners in the reserve “with a calf
at foot and in-calf a second time,” and by 1960 there were 277 females present in the
area.62 In a vacuum, the uptake of the ranching and destocking project here proved
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successful, as young male stock migrated to the area to be fattened and sold while the
quality of calves was improved through targeted breeding campaigns.
41 However,  flaws  soon  became evident  in  the  theoretical  foundations  of  the  project.
Compelling individuals to migrate their young stock into the B2 for breeding and sale
could only lessen pressure in the reserves if the stock population there remained static
or fell thanks to Malthusian checks. Indeed, the very point of limiting water access in
the reserves was to enforce an artificial cap on stock ownership, believing that owners
would be left with no other choice but to either migrate their young stock and then
dispose of older stock through either sale or death. However, the conflict between state
enforced  sale  or  redistribution  and  local  reticence  to  comply  initially  led  to  few
problems  in  the  years  between  1956  and  1960,  thanks  to  abundant  rainfall  in  the
reserves. Those who saw the benefit of stock improvement or sales did so, as evidenced
by the dramatic increase in steers within the B2 that were drawn by the abundance of
good grazing lands. Those unable to afford the fees,  or simply unwilling to migrate
their stock, continued to do so thanks to the copiousness of watering points and the
richness of grazing lands within the reserves. The ecological balance here drew the
state into a false sense of security, blinding them to the concerning increase in the
stock population of the reserves.
42 By 1960 however this favourable state of affairs was coming to a close as the population
of stock in Kitui as a whole began to increase tremendously, and the ADC feared that
the grasslands would no longer be able to hold the population. Without stock limitation
legislation in the reserves, as opposed to environmental controls, destocking would be
impossible.63 The impending ecological crisis was further exacerbated by the decision of
the African District Council in 1958 to remove dam construction and maintenance from
communal labour regulations, removing any local compulsion to fix broken dams or
boreholes.64 The motivations for this were two fold, in that it represented a form of
resistance towards state-led compulsion, while also implying that water development
should be part of the full state development program in the reserves. However, local
officials proved unwilling and unable to meet the labour or funding shortfall for the
dams due to a shortage of machinery that left many locations suffering from severe
shortages. As these resources dwindled, so the abundance of water in the B2 appeared
more egregious by the month. Outside of the district, similar pressures were building
across the border in Machakos, as unrestrained grazing left much of the district barren.
In  the  B1  Yatta,  across  the  Mwita  Syano  from the  B2,  the  Machakos  Development
Committee had proposed an implemented a settlement scheme that placed static plots
around a network of boreholes and the river itself;  again, access to better land and
watering was restricted to those willing to pay for it. The coalescence of factors in all of
the  surrounding  locations  left  the  B2  as  one  of  the  few,  if  not  the  only,  areas  of
abundant grazing pastures in the entire region.
43 The tenuous barriers of the project began to crumble throughout the long, dry summer
of 1960. The year stood as the third successive year of bad rains yet, much to the state’s
chagrin, “the Kitui livestock surprised all but its owners by its ability to survive almost
total  starvation,” a phenomenon that dealt  a  blow to the state’s  hopes that famine
would  “act  as  a  Malthusian  check  on  the  District’s  excessive  cattle  population.”65
Indeed, stock sales remained a last resort for owners within the reserve who preferred
to dispose of goats, chickens, and honey before their cattle, and despite the paucity of
resources  the  year  saw  a  net  increase  in  numbers  within  the  reserve.  Escalating
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population densities in the reserves led the African District Council to increase their
calls  for settlement to be allowed in the B2.  They considered the fee structure and
migration rights to be “onerous and unnecessary,” and that better use could be made of
the  area  if  it  was  settled  by  stockholders  from  the  reserves.66 By  this  stage,  the
estimated cattle population of the District as a whole was 274,000, some 64,000 greater
than the suggested carrying capacity of the land.67 Stockowners had begun to refuse
compulsory sale and slaughter, and fees continued to restrict the number of individuals
who could migrate young stock into B2. Accordingly, trespass into the area became
increasingly common that summer from both Kitui and Machakos.68 For all intents and
purposes, the reserves had become a pressure cooker, the land bursting at the seams as
available grasslands dwindled and with few outlets available. The B2’s very existence as
an Edenic grazing, watering, and breeding ground rested precariously on the reserves’
continued ability to withstand population growth, a phenomenon that in itself relied
upon rain and water resources. Those keystones would not last.
 
The B1 Yatta, 1952–61
44 The swift and abrupt transition to ranching and controlled access had been mirrored in
the B1. Long seen as the lesser of the two schemes, both in terms of its potential and its
administrative importance, overgrazing had pushed the area to its ecological limit. The
B1  Ranching  Scheme  had  from  1952  been  made  up  of  14  settlement  areas  each
consisting of between ten and fourteen farms. Stock ownership had been limited to just
fourteen cattle per farm, and each settlement lay within one mile of a water supply.69
However,  the only permanent supply before 1958 was the Athi  River,  which lay on
average nine miles from each settlement. Evidently, the lack of permanent, year-round
supplies acted as a further cap on stock ownership, as the availability of the resource
only provided enough to water calves and a maximum of three working stock. These
ecological  limits,  as  well  as  other  internal  pressures,  meant  that  management  of
grazing and migration proved difficult.
45 By 1957, it was clear to the District Agricultural Office that the area was suffering from
a number of linked issues,  stemming primarily from a lack of legal oversight.  Most
importantly, a lack of continuity in overseeing officers had led to both an abundance of
absentee  owners,  making  the  proper  disposal  of  stock  impossible,  and  the
encroachment  of  bush due to  illegal  overstocking and the  breakdown of  rotational
grazing that had occurred due to a lack of watering points.70 These issues appeared
especially stark within comparisons to the B2 area in Kitui, which was deemed to be
much more satisfactorily run than the Machakos side of the boundary.71 The dichotomy
between the Edenic lands of the Kitui Yatta and the barren and overstocked B1 would
prove  to  have  long  lasting  consequences,  and  pushed  the  Machakos  Agricultural
Committee to  plan remedial  work to  save the landscape.  To solve these issues,  the
District  Agricultural  Committee proposed a policy of permanent settlement over an
area  of  133,000 acres,  centred  around  five  paddocks  with  a  “suitable”  number  of
settlers  chosen  from  graziers  lacking  any  substantial  landholding  in  the  Machakos
reserve.72 These settlers would be allowed to graze twelve head of  cattle under the
system beginning in 1957, one paddock would be removed from grazing each year to
allow  for  a  regeneration  period  lasting  over  two  years.73 It  was  not  lost  on  the
committee that in the earliest  years of  the transition an enormous amount of  land
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would be removed from circulation. However, the deleterious effect this had on stock
owners  was  deemed  unavoidable  if  the  land  on  the  Yatta  was  to  be  rescued  from
encroaching bushlands, poor soils, and patchy grazing.74
46 Initially, the project reduced the number of cattle on the scheme from 7,000 to just
5,000,  a  figure still  below the fifty percent  reduction anticipated by the committee.
Nonetheless,  the project  served to  flood the reserve with non-renewed stock while
elevating the quality and services of the B1. Although popular with those chosen to
reside on the scheme, the giving over of precious water resources to a few fortunate
settlers caused consternation amongst the majority of graziers in the reserve. Further,
the tightening of administrative control over the region led to compulsory branding
and tagging as well as the outlawing of stock migration into the area. Such barriers
appeared  abruptly  in  the  eyes  of  Kamba in  the  reserves,  especially  those  absentee
owners who saw their large herds banished from the region. With little good grazing in
the  reserves  and  restrictions  on  the  movement  of  their  stock,  the  project  actually
exacerbated land issues  within the  reserves  that  contributed to  a  slow build  up in
population pressure. Having taken a laissez faire approach to the B1 in the past, the
settlement and grazing scheme tried too much too quickly. It is then unsurprising that
hostility became increasingly evident throughout 1958 and beyond, as conditions in the
reserve declined. Communal labour in the B1 declined alongside access restrictions,
while absentee owners refused to remove their stock from the region.75 The District
Office had long blamed the condition of the Machakos Yatta on the “uncooperative,
backwards,  and  selfish  attitude”  of  stockowners,  yet  in  actuality  their  responses
reflected a long term history of land use in the area that was being abruptly halted to
help manage land pressures that were of the state’s own making.76
47 By 1959, some of these pressures were becoming increasingly acute even within the
paddock project. Poor rains that year meant that many of the dams stood dry, and left
the  Athi  and  Mwita  Syano  rivers  as  the  only  viable  watering  grounds.77 Although
grazing remained passable at this stage, Paddock E on the southwestern edge of the B1
was beginning to exhibit a decay in grazing quality that was exceeded only by those of
the  reserves  themselves.  As  the  year  wore  on,  these  conditions  spread to  C  and D
Paddocks,  which began to exhibit  signs of overgrazing.  These conditions forced the
veterinary department to reduce the number of stock per acre, further ejecting animals
back into the already overcrowded reserves. By this stage, the number of stock units on
the plateau stood at  over  seven thousand,  well  over  the  recommended limit.78 The
necessity of stock reduction pushed the Veterinary Office to propose destocking via
either legislative reform or direct action, neither of which would prove popular with
the  increasing  number  of  settlers  seeking  any  and  all  adequate  grounds  for  their
animals.79 By May of the following year,  D and E paddocks constituted a “continual
problem of overgrazing, trespassing, and erosion” due to the continued lack of rain.
The presence of the Furrow mitigated these issues to a certain degree, and grazing
remained  good  on  Paddocks  A,  B,  and  C  thanks  to  better  rains,  but  on  the  whole
conditions on the Plateau and in the reserves deteriorated rapidly due to the prevailing
environmental conditions.
48 This deterioration reveals the fallacy at the heart of the B1 Scheme. Unlike the B2,
officers in Machakos first had to reign in what they saw as malignant land use, before
reinstating their  preferred policy.  The introduction of  the paddock project  reduced
available  lands  that  had  been  grazed  for  generations  and  made  essential  water
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resources  available  only  to  a  lucky  few.  However,  the  prevailing  conditions  of  the
reserves meant that grazing and population pressures across the entire district were
terminal in nature, and simply ejecting non-paying or absentee stockowners created an
overabundance of  animals  within the  reserve that  exacerbated ecological  pressures
there. As conditions deteriorated during the long droughts beginning in 1959, owners'
appetite for greener pastures and essential water resources contributed to a build-up in
pressure that pushed up against  the very boundaries  of  the district.  Making access
contingent  on  social  and  economic  control  left  an  enormous  underclass  of  owners
unwilling or unable to dispose of their stock, and desperate for any outlet for their
deteriorating stock.
 
The Fall of State Development on the B2 Yatta, 1961
Onwards
49 The failings of development policy in Kitui and the surrounding districts were many
and  manifest.  Collectively,  they  amounted  to  a  dependence  on  three  interrelated
conditions: Kamba willingness to dispose of their stock, the control and leverage of
limited water resources, and the ability to manage stock movement. Having failed in
the  first  case,  the  remaining  tenets  collapsed  during  a  period  of  previously
unprecedented climate conditions.
50 Despite  drought  being  manifest  in  the  surrounding reserves  and districts  after  the
summer of 1958, the B2 had remained plentifully watered thanks to the arrival of the
Yatta Furrow that year,  depositing ten cubic feet  per second into the Mwita Syano
river. However, the new resources were available only to those within the B2 or the
parallel B1 ranching scheme in Machakos, and both which saw rampant overgrazing on
their borders in the following years as desperate owners sought any available resources
for  their  stock.  Their  desperation  reached  a  head  in  1961  following  the  fourth
consecutive year of poor rains; the failure of the long rains between March and June
created acute drought conditions across the region, and the remaining watered lands in
Kitui  became “scarce and dangerously overgrazed.”80 The drought forced owners to
seek any available  oasis,  migrating their  stock further and further afield into open
lands in Galole and Garissa in search of grazing and water, bringing them into direct
competition  and  conflict  with  pastoralists  from across  the  colony  suffering  similar
paucities.81 Much closer to home, however, the barrier between the reserve and the B2
the western edge of the district was slowly collapsing under the weight of need, and the
proverbial breaking of the dam. While trespassers had been trickling into the region
over the previous three years, the number first became a stream, and then a wave.
51 In September 1961, some 20,000 head of cattle flooded across the border and into the B2
from surrounding locations in Kitui  and Machakos.82 The stock that arrived quickly
pushed their  way across  the area,  destroying waterpoints  and denudating the land
almost overnight, leaving both the state and Kitui stockholders in the area outraged.
Deposits  of  silt  and  mud  clogged  the  subsurface  dams,  and  vandals  deconstructed
pumping stations to sell for scrap or fodder.83 The weight of destruction wrought on the
state’s plans led them to shutter three boreholes completely to avoid “further wanton
damage.”84 In the south of the region, trespassers felled and burned acacia trees for
charcoal,  threatening soil  erosion. Within the breeding centre,  the heartland of the
state’s stock improvement and sales endeavour, the 16 Sahiwal bulls were threatened
A Wasted Eden: Colonial Water Management and Ecological Change in Kitui, Keny...
Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review, 55 | 2020
21
by a combination of theft and disease. The centre and the herds that passed through
underwent weekly dipping for tick control and the breakdown of order threatened the
rampant spread of tickborne diseases, while the arrival of undipped stock threatened
not  only  the  bulls  themselves  but  all  187  calves  residing  there.  J.  R.  Stephens,  the
Livestock Officer, recommended the calves and heifers be returned to their owners in
the  reserves  and  that  the  bulls  be  sold.  He  considered  their  chances  of  survival
extremely remote without mandated tick control, a degree of protection that the state
could not offer as their authority of the land dissolved.85 He advised that the remaining
fee-paid stock and the bulls be moved to the only remaining watered enclosure in the
scheme,  where  they  could  be  overseen  by  a  reduced  number  of  staff  until  all
trespassing  stock  had  been  evicted.  These  defensive  manoeuvres  proved  fruitless
however, as the Sahiwal bulls were soon stolen by vandals.86 The scale of destruction
appeared so bad that it  appeared “doubtful  if  it  could ever be resuscitated without
strong action to throw out the trespasser.”87
52 The permeability of the western boundary inspired Kitui stockholders to assert their
authority over what was considered to be Kitui lands. Of the 436 stockowners to have
had their cattle accepted into the area at the outset of 1961, a mere 15 had paid their
fees  while  the  remainder  bluntly  refused.  For  those  stockowners,  it  seemed nearly
absurd  to  be  charged  for  land  that  was  now  being  destroyed  by  non-fee  paying
Machakos  Kamba,  and  Stephens  considered  it  deeply  unethical  to  take  the  421
abstentionists to court.88 In total, illegal trespass cost the scheme close to Shs 54,000,
and the outlook appeared so bleak that Stephens advised the project be shut down in
its  entirety until  the land had recovered and a mechanism implemented to compel
Kitui stockowners to pay their fees.89 Such was the financial shortfall  that the Kitui
Agricultural Committee felt it improper for the African District Council to meet its loan
repayments to the government for loan repayments of £704 for the B2 Scheme, as well
as a £400 repayment for their share of the Yatta Furrow financing.90 Although financial
concerns played a major part in this decision, the Committee also considered that the
government  had  “failed  to  take  adequate,  or  in  fact  any,  steps  to  evict  the  illegal
trespass of… Machakos stock which had caused the present catastrophic situation on
the Yatta.”91 Further, the committee endorsed the proposal from District Commissioner
Galton-Fenzi that a committee be set up consisting of B2 Graziers, ADC members, and
the  district’s  Legislative  Council  Members;  the  committee  were  to  report  on  the
viability  of  the  scheme moving  forward,  and the  level  of  localized  support  for  the
grazing scheme.92 Crucially, the committee would contain members from each of the
locations  surrounding the project,  a  critical  inclusion given the localized antipathy
towards the scheme’s incarceration of essential watering and grazing grounds.
53 However even before these proposals could be acted upon, climate conditions served to
further undermine the viability of grazing proposals in the region. While it had been
drought that precipitated the unrestrained trespass of stock into the B2, the short rains
at the end of 1961 washed away any hope of repair and progress. Over forty-two inches
of rain fell between October and December in the District, a volume that amounted to
the annual average in the prior three years.93 Although the rains provided relief to
drought-stricken farmers and led to the outmigration of Machakos trespassers from
the  B2,  the  costs  of  the  deluge  far  outweighed  these  positives.  Rainfall  across  the
country had led to widespread floods and destruction across the eastern portion of the
nation, and these implications were felt acutely in Kitui as the raging waters damaged
properties, dams, and townships. The Kenyan Government required that all districts
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provide  information  as  to  the  damage,  in  order  to  spur  the  British  state  into
reconstructive action.94 For Kitui, this meant emergency relief works to repair dams
and roads that had been washed away by the floods of late 1961. The unprecedented
damage, the Agricultural Committee claimed, had occurred not simply because of the
heavy rains, but also the behaviour and incompetence of local Kamba in the district.
Ever since dam work had been removed from communal labour regulations in 1958, the
committee had consistently claimed that the community were failing to take adequate
measures to protect dam projects, and were not being proactive in their maintenance.95
As  a  result,  the  grazing  of  cattle  near  to  the  dams  had  eroded  their  banks,  while
spillways “had been allowed to become choked with weeds and could not cope with the
overflow.”96 Given  the  Committee’s  view  that  these  failures  had  been  largely  self-
inflicted the Committee refused to fund the repair of the communal dams, believing the
money to  be unjustified “in view of  the largely  uncooperative attitude of  the local
people” in the past.97 However, this perspective fails to recognize the nature of colonial
water policy at large that left the majority of resources restricted to the B2 area, and
those within the locations reliant upon unpaid communal labour despite the existence
of a national framework of water management infrastructure that existed for this very
purpose.
54 Within  the  B2  Yatta,  the  state’s  remedial  approach  proved  to  be  equally  tepid.  By
March 1962 the area continued to be inundated with illegal Machakos and Kitui stock,
and owners proved fully unwilling to cooperate with the development committee to
root them out. Ear-marking was proposed as a means of rooting out illegal graziers, but
the plan was uniformly rejected given that it would have enforced the payment of fees
on what was now a defunct project.98 The state went so far as to reject the graziers’
compromise of a reduction of fees, and began to pursue legal action against trespassers
through ADC and judicial  frameworks.  Although refusals  to  pay certainly  fit  into  a
wider regional and national atmosphere of non-cooperation driven by the coming of
uhuru, in this case in Ukambani resistance fit a longer-term narrative of resource access
and belonging.99 Environmental and ecological pressures had combined to generate a
situation  whereby  the  state’s  attitude  towards  land  and  population  management
became untenable. Making access to water and good grazing contingent on financial
strength  had  proven  feasible  during  periods  of  relative  abundance  thanks  to  the
presence  of  dominant  stock  owners  and  equilibrium in  the  reserves.  However,  the
unpopularity  of  resource  exclusion  meant  that  any  opportunity  to  circumvent  the
state’s control of the B2 was taken with enthusiasm and would not be returned. The
question of access and trespass thus became a waiting game throughout 1962,  with
graziers aware of impending independence and the state vainly projecting a figment of
authority.
55 For a time, the status quo that this engendered brought some stability. Enforced ear-
tagging had succeeded in weeding out Machakos stock, while fee-paying Kitui stock
began to  arrive.  The  District  Livestock  Officer  even  suggested  further  proposals  to
improve the viability of the project that included the provision of bomas for housing
stock, as well as free inoculations.100 However, the viability of these suggestions were
curtailed by the growing realization of  Kenyan independence.  With seemingly little
warning the central government degazetted the B2 in late 1962, converting the entire
region into a native land unit as opposed to crown lands.101 In effect, this ceased all
government control of grazing in the region, and broke down any distinction between
the area and the surrounding locations. Any continuation of the scheme as a delineated
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and managed project thus necessitated an amendment to the ADC rules,  which was
forthcoming in March 1963. In practice, the change in designation meant very little;
control  of  the  scheme  had  been  delegated  to  the  ADC  since  1952,  meaning  the
transition simply moved ultimate authority from Nairobi to Kitui. Nonetheless, there is
symbolic meaning in this change. Rather than existing as part of a centralized network
of  land  management  and  water  schemes  the  B2  passed  into the  hands  of  local
government, in effect making its management the concern of a locally elected body of
stockholders  and politicians.  As  the transition to  uhuru accelerated,  the B2 became
symbolic of the transfer of power that disposed of the colonial state’s apparent belief in
the greater good of modernist  planning,  towards a more decentralized approach to
land management and access arrangements. That the terms of access changed little had
much to do with the continuities in the ADC’s composition, but nonetheless the B2
continued as a grazing scheme open to any willing to take a licence.102
56 In the following postcolonial  years however,  the area would transition from a paid
grazing scheme to its current form as a cooperative ranching endeavour, defined by the
mutual  ownership  of  cattle  and  the  distribution  of  fees  and  profits  amongst  the
collective.103 The Committee hoped that a cooperative project would create a sense of
ownership  amongst  graziers  sceptical  of  the  benefits  of  paid  grazing,  leading  to
communal  responsibility  and  an  improved  landscape  while  also  paying  for  the
maintenance of water resources in the area.104 On the B2, this ultimately led to the land
being leased from the district on a 999 year lease,  and the herd owned collectively
(International  Livestock  Centre  for  Africa  (Kenya),  1979).  By  1979,  the  ranch
encompassed  over  22,000 hectares,  and  was  made  up  of  548  owners.  Under  this
arrangement, water and land improvement policies are undertaken from the funds of




57 The B2 Yatta stands as an exercise symptomatic of Britain’s failed development goals in
Kenya more generally. The project was defined by tenuous and ever-changing policies
based upon apocryphal and culturally inappropriate understandings of Kamba land and
livelihoods  (of  the  type  described  by  Tignor,  Osborne,  and  others),  all  of  which
contributed  to  widespread  ecological  decay  in  the  pursuit  of  environmental  and
territorial  control.  By  providing  water  resources  to  an  exclusive  region  while
deliberately neglecting those in the reserves, the state attempted to enforce territorial
control by weaponizing the precarious ecology of the Yatta. Although the B2 grazing
scheme started on relatively firm (if flawed) foundations thanks to the clear priority of
lessening land pressure in the reserves, the shift towards an explicitly profit-making
ranching scheme served to  close  the  B2  to  all  except  those  willing  to  accept  state
sanctions. As a result, the state’s neglect of the reserves can be considered a deliberate
attempt to destroy local environmental conditions in the pursuit of their wider social
and  economic  goals,  as  the  protection  of  watering  and  grazing  grounds  behind  a
financial barrier served to exacerbate overcrowding and consumption in the reserves.
58 As such,  this  article  argues  that  the  destruction of  the colonial  B2  project  in  Kitui
occurred due to  an ecological  crisis  of  the  state’s  own making on a  regional  scale,
having directed their policies towards profits rather than people. Rather than investing
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and  distributing  water  to  the  community  at  large,  it  was  instead  deemed  to  be  a
privileged granted only to the wealthy or the acquiescent. The episode thus reveals the
critical flaws inherent in the state’s development ideology more generally that saw an
initially useful, if defective, grazing scheme replaced by increasingly coercive methods
that  ensured  the  death  and  dispersal  of  stock  across  the  region.  The  loggerhead
between this ideology and the economic and material needs of the people made conflict
inevitable, a conflict that was eventually decided by shifting environmental conditions.
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ABSTRACTS
This research paper historicizes colonial water management policies in Kitui, Kenya, under the
British colonial state. British development policy weaponized water shortages in order to enforce
destocking amongst Kamba populations, leading to a wide array of ecological challenges. The
paper  contends  that  the  state’s  use  of  water  as  a  tool  of  population  management  and  land
improvement was based on flawed ideas of society and environment that ultimately contributed
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